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Two years later, as President of the United States, Obama delivered a compelling Nowruz address to the Iranian people in which he made a strong case for a nuanced approach to Iran. In his 2009 Iranian New Year message, Obama envisioned a future with "renewed exchanges among our people and greater opportunities for partnership."
However, he understood, as demonstrated in his rhetoric and action, that this future was only possible through tough diplomacy mixed with pressure, when appropriate, cunning engagement with the Iranian people, and international cooperation.
Unlike neoconservative foreign policy thinkers, Obama and his team recognized that regime change by force, draconian economic punishments, and military action against Iranian nuclear facilities would only embolden Iranian hardliners while alienating an Iranian public that is actually unusually pro-American.
Today, as he approaches the twilight of a presidency with a decidedly mixed foreign policy record, President Obama can rightfully triumph the results of the agreed upon multilateral framework for a nuclear deal with Iran. The successful results of the negotiations of his persistent Secretary of State, John Kerry, with Iran's U.S.-educated foreign minister, Javad Zarif, and several major American allies thus far indicate that Obama's sensible vision is being reaffirmed.
The deal significantly limits Iran's uranium enrichment abilities, allows for extremely intrusive inspections, reduces their capacity to ever consider weaponization, and permits gradual sanctions relief upon verification. In important wins for the United States, the deal cuts in half the number of spinning centrifuges at the Natanz facility and the controversial Arak reactor "would operate on a limited basis that would not provide enough fuel for a bomb," The New York Times reported.
Crucially, the deal appears strong enough that it is being lauded by the director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association as being a good deal, for what it's worth. It's the kind of comprehensive solution advocated for by Middle East policy expert Kenneth Pollack in The Persian Puzzle, former longtime U.S. diplomats Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, ex-CIA agent and nuclear nonproliferation expert Valerie Plame Wilson, and foreign policy fellows at respected institutions like the Center for American Progress and the New American Foundation, including scores of American and Israeli generals.
This expert consensus only augments President Obama's case for this deal as it is reflective of his trust of an evidence-based policy backed by experienced diplomats, military officials, and negotiators. Further, it's vital to note that our sanctions on Iran's human rights abusers and terrorism-related sanctions remain in place thus ensuring that pressure on radical elements of the government remains in place.
To understand why this deal is such a big win for Obama and his vision on Iran is to understand the aforementioned history of his views, as well as the implications of this news. In terms of the Obama team's approach, the President bet that public diplomacy a la his Nowruz messages, his letters to Iran's leaders, and exempting food and medicine and personal technology from sanctions, among other actions, would help deconstruct the "Great Satan" image of the United States among Iranians.
It worked, from all we know, as several polls, articles, and other accounts of the Obama era indicate the Iranian people are remarkably not only pro-American but also pro-Obama. That kind of approach allowed for the Iranian people to put pressure on their leaders to work constructively with the U.S. to resolve the nuclear issue. As Iranians saw that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime was not interested in serious diplomacy with the U.S. on this issue and as the Iranian public sought sanctions relief, they fled to the polls to vote in the more moderate Hassan Rouhani.
Beyond that, the Obama administration embraced strong-armed diplomacy over hawkish belligerence but still pulled it all off without strengthening the worst elements of the regime. They did this because they understood that diplomacy and negotiations with Iran would strengthen the hand of the more sensible elements of Iran's government. Those elements wished better relations with the U.S. in order to become part of the community of nations and it is those elements that finally took the reigns in 2013.
If Obama had instead pursued a more punitive and bellicose policy, it would have blown up in his face. That approach could have meant genocidal sanctions and military action that would only have helped Iranian hardliners make the case to their citizens that the U.S. is an evil power thus helping justifying a case for nuclear weapons. The evidence that military strikes would even work to dismantle Iranian nuclear facilities was not convincing either.
Meanwhile, the hardliners would be marginalized through this negotiation process because the radicals' entire foreign policy framework is based on disseminating an image of the U.S. as the "Great Satan." They shun cooperation with the U.S., as evidenced with the ultraconservative Majlis' effort to condemn Zarif for taking a stroll with Kerry in Geneva. As the Iranian people saw clearly that the U.S. was interested in resolving the nuclear issue peacefully, it would become increasingly harder for the regime to paint the U.S. as the world's greatest evil.
Vitally too, the Obama administration ramped up sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Iranian state-run media, and other elements of the regime known for their flagrant human rights violations without allowing their broader-based sanctions to resemble 1990's Iraq sanctions that contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths. Again, this policy was based on the notion of empowering the Iranian people and moderates but reducing the power of hardliners.
Lastly, the administration bet on multilateral, hard-nosed, and exhaustive diplomacy that incorporated the top foreign ministers of major world powers and Iran to be the final key to peacefully resolving this matter. As noted above, Obama followed the advice of experienced foreign policy experts in taking on this task.
He did so because the administration knew this kind of deal -- inspections and enrichment limits in exchange for sanctions relief -- was in reach for many reasons: Iran had previously expressed sympathy to these terms in 2003, the Iranian government badly wanted sanctions relief to grow their economy, and the Rouhani/Zarif mindset was one that sought this diplomacy in order to make Iran a world player. Obama also recognized that the alternatives to such an approach were unacceptable: tougher sanctions and war, neither of which benefited the Iranian people.
Obama's bet is paying off, as seen in today's news. The implications are potentially huge as the U.S.' leadership role here in bringing Iran out of isolation and showing commitment to diplomacy will only improve our image among Iranians. The symbolic, anecdotal evidence of this is seen already as Iranian state-run TV, in an unusual move, aired Obama's Rose Garden speech on the deal live and many Iranians took to Twitter to take selfies with and celebrate Obama.
Importantly too, the deal will empower Rouhani, who has taken on the Revolutionary Guards (among other radicals), who ran on negotiating with the West, but weaken hardliners opposed to diplomacy. The deal could open the door to economic relief for Iran thus allowing for a more open, freer economy that could set the stage for a freer Iran, both in commerce and in politics.
Obviously, most importantly, the deal cuts off pathways to a nuclear weapon, as described by both Obama in the Rose Garden and by the Arms Control Association, which is obviously good news for international security. If Iran ever were to obtain a nuclear weapon, it would be a harmful development that would trigger an arms race in the Middle East and Iran's support of its own horrid Quds Force, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Bashar Assad makes weaponization a scary prospect. To prevent a weapon, without having to engage militarily in what could become a disastrous back and forth, is a big victory for global stability.
Much remains to be seen and Iran's leaders have shown before that they cannot be fully trusted but, for now, this deal is a huge win for the President, for the Iranian people, and for peace. Certainly, as a son of Iranian immigrants and as a supporter of President Obama, it is a good day.
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